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Abstract
This study is an examination of teachers’ perceptions of monetary incentives including
supplementary stipends and merit pay within the state of New Jersey. Participants (N = 619)
completed an online questionnaire to indicate their opinions of remuneration for mentoring,
teaching in subject shortage areas or high priority locations, sponsorship of co-curricular
activities, increases for exceptional performance within a given year, school wide bonuses for all
faculty based upon school performance, “sign on” bonuses for the initial year of employment,
and performance-related promotion based upon career ladder steps. Participants indicated no
opposition to stipends for extra duties and strong opposition to merit pay incentives based upon
performance. There were no significant differences (p < .05) for various forms of merit pay by
assignment, location, and years of teaching experience except between early (38%) and middle
(63%)/late (70%) career teacher experience level groupings in their opposition to “sign on”
bonuses (χ = 10.04, p < .05). Analyses of qualitative data regarding opposition to merit pay
identified the following themes: (a) competition, (b) subjectivity, (c) ethics, and (d) inequity. A
need for continued study is discussed and suggestions for future investigations are proposed.
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Introduction
Objective factors including years of experience and professional growth such as
workshop credits, graduate degrees, or other forms of professional development, form the basis
of the traditional method of remuneration, which results in a single salary schedule. This model
establishes a base salary for each teacher regardless of grade level or subject taught. While most
teacher salary schedules cap off at certain pay levels based upon a predetermined number of
years of experience or education, some districts occasionally grant supplementary stipends to
teachers who coach extracurricular sports, sponsor after school clubs, or direct co-curricular
music ensembles. To date, this salary table remains the most commonly used approach for
compensating teachers throughout the United States (Elpus, 2011).
While the fixed salary schedule is predictable, noncompetitive, and objective, several
researchers, politicians, and educators scrutinize its effectiveness in retaining excellent teachers
and rewarding achievement (Hanushek & Rivkin, 2004). Critics of the fixed salary schedule
assert that it is designed to reward time and service instead of performance quality (National
Center on Education and the Economy, 2007). Others contend the lack of monetary incentives in
such a salary schedule “pushes high performers out of the profession” (Greene & Forster, 2008,
p.2). Some identify the inherent lack of flexibility in differentiating pay across subjects or
assignments as a disadvantage of the single salary schedule. Moreover, additional pay for
working in undesirable conditions is not an option under this type of contractual agreement
(Heneman & Kimball, 2008).
Federal and state lawmakers recently passed legislation to include K-12 administration
and teacher merit pay programs to improve student achievement and retain excellent teachers
(Podgursky & Springer, 2007). For example, legislation encouraged local administrators to
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“shine a spotlight on and reward excellence in teaching through compensation and promotion” as
outlined in the Federal Race to the Top competitive grant program (United States Department of
Education, 2009, pg. 69). Several individual district officials have adopted merit pay plans to
attract and retain excellent teachers, to incentivize them to do superior work, and to discourage
weak ones from remaining in the field (Inman, 1984; Fulbeck, 2014). Although Liu, Johnson,
and Peske (2004) found that signing bonuses and other financial incentives had a limited effect
on recruiting new teachers, Richardson (1999) stated, “It is probably starting salaries that have a
disproportionate influence on young teachers’ career choices” (pg. 28). Similarly, in a study of
music teachers at risk for attrition and migration, Hancock (2008) noted that “a $10,000 increase
in base salary reduced the odds of being a high attrition/migration risk by almost 40%” (p. 139).
Despite these efforts, a recent survey of 10,000 teachers sponsored by Scholastic and the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation (2012) revealed that only 16% of the teachers felt that performance
pay helped to retain good colleagues while 26% of the respondents felt that performance pay
would have a strong or very strong impact on student achievement.
“Buy-in” is the acceptance of proposed reform policies prior to the enactment or
implementation of such initiatives. Business leaders from The New American Schools (1998), a
nonprofit organization interested in funding and improving the quality of public education,
stressed that new school designs must include “teachers’ input and commitment, and offer
structures to involve them in planning and managing the education of their students” (New
American Schools, 1998, p. 6). Previous investigators of school reform implementation
concluded that teacher commitment and support were integral and necessary aspects of
successful policy change or new policy adoption (Fuhman, 1991; Slavin & Fashola, 1998;
McGowan, 1988). Turnbull (2002) identified several predictors of teacher acceptance of school
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reform programs: support from staff members, administrator buy-in, and control over classroom
implementations. Leigh (2013) revealed mixed results in the complexities of designing and
implementing effective incentive programs. Vagi (2014) suggested the possibility of music being
overlooked in compensation reform as it is often considered to be outside of the “core”
curriculum. Consequently, “if music teachers feel that the financial awards associated with their
work are limited by virtue of their position, it is likely that many music teachers may consider
leaving the profession” (Vagi, 2014, p. 102). According to Elpus (2011), “music education
scholarship has unfortunately been silent on the issue of teacher compensation—reformed or
otherwise” (p. 181). If the successful implementation of new educational reform policies relies in
part on teacher buy-in, it would deem beneficial to determine if teachers are supportive of merit
pay prior to the implementation and administration of such a program.
Although there is a considerable body of research on the remuneration for teachers at
large, there is a paucity of research literature specifically related to extra duty compensation and
merit pay for arts educators. Several scholars have suggested a variety of performance-based
proposals for compensating music teachers (Cowden, 1988; Elpus, 2011). However, there are
few empirical studies related to the benefits of merit pay or the acceptance of such compensation
programs by music educators. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to investigate the
perceptions of music teachers regarding professional supplementary remuneration and merit pay
programs. The research questions guiding this study were:
1. Do a majority of public school music teachers support and receive extra duty stipends
and/or merit pay?
2. Are there differences of opinion regarding extra duty stipends and merit pay between
early, middle, and late career music teachers?
3. Are there differences of opinion regarding extra duty stipends and merit pay between
elementary, middle, and high school music teachers?
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4. Are there differences of opinion regarding extra duty stipends and merit pay between
rural, suburban, and urban music teachers?
5. What are the individual concerns of music teachers regarding extra duty stipends and
merit pay?
Method
Procedures
In the present study, I used an online questionnaire to collect descriptive data (see
Appendix for Merit Pay Study Questionnaire). A thorough review of the research literature
preceded questionnaire design and questions from the National Center for Education Statistics
Schools and Staffing Survey (2011-2012) formed the basis of the survey. I requested
demographic information on teaching assignment (elementary, middle, high), years of teaching
experience, and school setting (rural, suburban, urban). Further, I asked participants to share their
opinions of supplementary compensation and merit pay as they related to the following: (a)
mentoring, (b) teaching in shortage areas (e.g. math or science) or high priority locations (e.g.
inner city), (c) sponsorship of co-curricular activities, (d) individual increases for exceptional
performance within a given year, (e) school wide bonuses for all faculty based upon school
performance, (f) “sign on” bonuses for the initial year of employment, and (g) performancerelated promotion based upon career ladder steps. Likert-scale gradations of teacher opinions
ranged from “strongly favor” to “strongly oppose” for each of the aforementioned incentives. At
the end of the survey, I included an optional comment section to elicit qualitative data regarding
individual concerns and thoughts about merit pay.
Sample
Participants (N = 619) in this study consisted of music teachers currently employed by
public school districts within the state of New Jersey. I accessed a list of public school district
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websites (n = 693) from the State of New Jersey Department of Education directory of public
schools (http://education.state.nj.us/directory/) and subsequently reviewed all public school
website faculty listings to determine if each school employed music teachers. On a spreadsheet, I
then recorded individual music teacher email addresses (n = 3,003), sorted them by county, and
made two email attempts to obtain responses from the participants. Each email contained an
opening letter of consent with a Uniform Resource Locator (URL) link that allowed them to
enter a secured website hosted by an internet-based survey company:
http://www.questionpro.com/. Several email requests (n = 68) were undeliverable or bounced
back, resulting in a total of 2,935 active email addresses.
Results
Participant Demographics
A final return rate of 21% (N = 619) resulted from the primary source participant pool. In
light of the modest response rate, I conducted further examination of the returned data and
revealed that response rates regarding teaching assignment types generally mirrored figures
published by The New Jersey Arts Education Partnership (2012). Additionally, I found a
correlation between self reported school location assignment percentages of the target population
and state data from the United States Census Bureau (2010). While the response rate was less
than desired, the actual number of respondents was relatively high and relevant according to
large-sample survey criteria outlined by Babbie (1990) and Creswell (2002).
Respondents reported a majority of their teaching assignments as follows: (a)
elementary/K-5, (44.87%; n = 280), (b) middle/6-8, (28.69%; n = 179), and (c) high school/9-12,
(26.44%; n = 165). Most teachers indicated suburban (71.63%; n = 447) locations for their
current teaching assignments followed by urban (19.71%; n = 123) and rural (8.65%; n = 54)
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geographic settings respectively. An open-ended question regarding the number of years taught
inclusive of the current year yielded responses ranging from one to forty-four years (M = 16.29)
of teaching experience for the total population. The following categories denote years of teaching
experience: early career (1-4), middle career (5-19), and late career (20 or more). Results
included slightly more middle career respondents (52.18%; n = 323) than early career (10.66%; n
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= 66) and late career teachers (37.16%; n = 230) combined as presented in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Participant years of teaching experience.
Quantitative Data Responses
Using Chi-square analyses, I tested for differences in opinions regarding various stipends
and forms of merit pay (i.e. mentoring, teaching in subject shortage area or high priority
locations, sponsorship of co-curricular activities, individual increases for exceptional
performance within a given year, school wide bonuses for all faculty based upon school
performance, “sign on” bonuses for the initial year of employment, and performance-related
promotion based upon career ladder steps). Participants selected Likert scale rankings from
strongly favor to strongly oppose for each of the aforementioned stipends and sources of merit
pay. I found significant differences for each of the 8 variables (p < .01). Descriptive data on
participants’ earnings and opinions of various pay incentives and supplements are in Table 1.
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Table 1
Participants’ Earnings and Opinions of Pay Incentives and Supplements
Strongly
Mildly
Incentive/Supplement
R
NR
Favor
Favor
1. Mentor responsibilities for
33.6
66.4
new colleagues or student
67.69%
%
%
26.33%
teachers
2. Teaching in a shortage area
.48 99.52
11.47
27.30
such as math or science
3. Teaching in a high priority
location (i.e. inner city
3.07 96.93
27.95
47.01
school)
4. Sponsoring Co-curricular
activities (marching band or
78.51 21.49
89.98
6.95
musicals)
5. Individual increase for
exceptional performance in a
1.13 98.87
24.72
30.21
given year
6. School wide bonus for all
faculty based upon school
.97 99.03
17.77
30.37
performance
7. Performance related
26.66
37.48
promotion based upon career 23.10 76.90
ladder steps
8. “Sign On” bonus for initial
year of employment within
.65 99.35
14.05
22.94
district
Note. R = Received by participant, NR = Not Received by participant

Mildly
Oppose
3.72%

Strongly
Oppose
2.26%

29.08

32.15

15.02

10.02

.97

2.10

17.61

27.46

23.42

28.43

15.83

20.03

27.46

35.54

More than 50% of survey respondents mildly to strongly opposed three of the variables:
(a) teaching in a subject shortage area, (b) schoolwide bonuses for all faculty based upon school
performance, and (c) “sign on” bonuses for the initial year of employment. I further analyzed
these variables to test for differences in responses by teaching assignment, school location, and
years of teaching experience. No significant differences (p < .05) for teaching in a subject
shortage area and schoolwide bonuses by assignment, location, and years of teaching experience
were discovered. However, I found significant differences between various music teacher
experience level groupings’ opposition to “sign on” bonuses [χ (2, N = 619) = 10.04, p < .05]
2
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with a majority of middle (63%) and late (70%) career teachers and less than half of all early
(38%) career participants mildly or strongly opposed to such monetary supplements.
Qualitative Data Responses
I elicited qualitative data from participants by having them complete open ended
comments. Participants (n = 271) provided detailed commentary. I subsequently coded freeresponse data utilizing HyperRESEARCH software to identify emerging themes. While a
majority (n = 202) of the respondents expressed negative opinions of merit pay, none of them
objected to stipends for extra duties or commitments of time (e.g. sponsorship of co-curricular
activities, after school rehearsals, field trips, etc.). Coding of the comments occurred across the
following emergent themes: (a) competition, (b) subjectivity, (c) ethics, and (d) inequity.
Most respondents in favor of merit pay (n = 34) indicated the need for clearly defined “criteria”
that is “fair and objective” and questioned the appropriate implementation of such a program.
Remaining comments (n = 35) included neutral statements about merit pay or unrelated matters
(e.g. parents, working conditions, and assessment) and were coded “other.”
Competition
Several comments regarded the negative effects of competition as a result of merit pay
initiatives and how such programs may undermine collegiality:
Participant 98: Hour-to-hour pay parity is most effective in keeping a collaborative spirit among
educators. Competing for money based on incentives fosters animosity and a lack of team work.
Students need a team of educators, not educators who operate as every man for himself. It takes a
faculty working together to educate a community.
Participant 116: Our music department, though diverse in age, is a very close knit family that
supports each other on many levels, both professional and personal. Ours is a collegial, not
competitive environment. Enter merit pay and end caring about each other.

Other respondents also expressed concern regarding the division of the faculty and its effects on
students. One respondent typed that merit pay will “pit teacher against teacher and undermine the
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basic teaching principles of educating students” (Participant 170) while another noted that
teachers will “compete for money rather than working together for the common good of
students” (Participant 13). “Competition” and “jealousy” were frequently used terms in the
discussion of merit pay as it related to the “erosion of comraderie among music faculties”
(Participant 209).
Subjectivity
Several respondents expressed opposition to merit pay based upon the perceived
subjective nature of music evaluation:
Participant 158: How do you measure talent or artistic ability? A large program
(numbers) does not a quality program make or vice versa. You have no control over
scheduling or facilities which greatly influence a program’s success. If you are an
instrumental teacher at a higher level, you have no control of what was handed to you and
how far can you really grow an instrumental program if students have missed three or
four base years of instruction?
Participant 38: Merit pay on any level is hard to determine because of the various factors
and levels of achievement and success. In music, success can mean very different things
to many different people. A performance very often cannot be simply right or wrong,
good or bad, as is the case with some subjects that can be assessed using concrete means.

Participant 128 expressed the opinion that “music is such a field that is both subjective in its
nature as well as difficult to measure objectively, merit pay would not always be a great
incentive for performance.” On the other hand, those in favor of merit pay suggested
“measurable assessments of student growth in music” by conducting “student-driven proficiency
tests” and evaluating “how students perform in concerts, festivals, All-State (and all subdivisions
thereof), etc.” (Participants 83 & 126).
While a few respondents supported the perfomance-based aspects of music as a means of
assessing and rewarding teacher effectiveness, a majority of teachers had reservations about
compensating teachers for successful student performance:
Participant 181: While I believe well-trained musicians can and should give evaluative
feedback about ensemble performances, the notion of giving a band director whose group
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earns a “Superior” a merit pay bonus seems absurd. Sometimes the best educational
interests of a music program don’t result in the best performances. For example, students
who have trouble matching pitch shouldn’t be immediately excluded from singing in a
choir. But merit pay would pressure directors to make decisions like that regularly.

The process versus product issue for measuring student success surfaced in several responses as
Participant 97 commented, “so much of what we do is in the process, not the product, yet
everyone wants to make a judgment based on the product. . . how far have the students come
since rehearsals began?” Another music educator noted the possible teaching pedagogical flaws
in producing a polished performance by stating “performing groups can sound good when using
such methods as teaching by rote therefore actually rewarding bad teaching” (Participant 184).
Many teachers questioned the level of expertise among administrators and their ability to
assess subject specific criteria. Rhetorical questions varied from “How are we judged? Are there
qualified people making the decisions?” to “Do they know how challenging certain instruments
or certain skills are to teach at that particular grade level?” and “Will suggestions come from a
board member, who doesn’t think the marching band plays enough pep tunes at a football game
or from a qualified expert in music education?” (Participants 108 & 210). Comments often
criticized non-music administrators and supervisors for lacking the appropriate knowledge to
evaluate the quality of a music program:
Participant 35: Considering the fact that tests do not truly display learning, and that
“educators” and politicians at the highest levels cannot figure out what makes a good
teacher, I wonder how they can figure out something as abstract as music or any of the
other arts.
Participant 231: If it isn’t flashy and doesn’t feature costumes and choreography, then
administrators, and most parents I might add, do not realize its value. My goal is to give
students skills that last for a lifetime, not just to spend all my time generating
performances to please administrators. Who is going to decide what is quality and what
has value? If you have non-music people making those decisions, even though I work
very hard at what I believe in, I’ll never be one of those teachers that get merit pay.

Negative comments regarding supervisors outside of the field evaluating and rewarding teacher
performance reflected a continuous thread in the discussion and resisting of merit pay.
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Ethics
Ethical concerns among respondents regarding merit pay included nepotism, political
self-interests, and gaming the system. Several participants evidenced an unwillingness to accept
monetary compensation beyond traditional stipends. Participant 114 explained, “I do not believe
in ‘charging’ the taxpayers more than a traditional stipend for exceptional work, we should
provide exceptional work regardless of pay because it is the right thing to do. It’s the reason we
entered the profession.” Yet another respondent wrote, “Those who love to teach, love their
students and make a difference in the lives of the students deserve merit pay” (Participant 251).
A lack of trust in those in power who make decisions seemed to surface in many
comments related to the ethics of merit pay. For example, several teachers mentioned the
potential for “abuse” and “corruption” among local educational leaders:
Participant 45: I think merit pay would work in a utopian perfect world, but in our
district, with the nepotism and corruption, I fear merit pay would be used to promote
friends and family members of the administration. I do not trust nor do I have any
confidence in public school administrators.
Participant 112: The main purpose of merit pay proposals is to destroy salary guides and
further weaken unions. If all raises were based on “merit pay” as opposed to longevity
and contract steps, many administrators would simply freeze pay for a majority of
teachers, and raise just a few based on so-called “merit” in order to cover things.

Another teacher observed, “Merit pay erodes salary raises and step increases. Guaranteed the
budget for merit pay would disappear and faculties would be left with no pay increases forever”
(Participant 209). Several respondents perceived threats to existing teachers’ unions as the
overall purpose for collective bargaining and worried that merit pay would compromise voice of
solidarity among colleagues. Participant 130 perceived the exchange of favors for favors as well
as the existence of a “good ol’ boys club” in which those who belong to the inner circle of the
administration receive merit pay as opportunities for abuse in an already corrupt system.
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While a few respondents considered merit pay to be a validation of good work and
indicated they would not teach better or differently, others indicated that monetary incentives
might foster a teaching to the test philosophy or cheating the system strategy. One teacher stated,
“If teachers were motivated by money to win competitions, they might aim for the easiest
competitions or be extrinsically motivated to a point of disregarding ‘art’ in favor of monetary
gain” (Participant 246). Another participant noted the opportunity to skew results in order to
receive merit pay:
Participant 110: Individual teachers would have an incentive to work with the numbers
and assessments to give the appearance of student growth. As a piano lab teacher, I can
create a pretest that I know students will perform poorly on so that my benchmark and
final assessments will show how much they improved!

Others summarized compromised integrity as “those who are tempted will falsify results to
appear better than they are.”
Inequities
There were several comments written about potential inequities related to merit pay, most
of which focused on external variables such as scheduling, resources, and socioeconomic factors.
The theme of fairness appeared several times as respondents indicated concern about the
inconsistencies in funding as well as administrative and community support among public school
music programs:
Participant 49: I know of other teachers that are equally as good as I am, but are not
supported by their administrators and their programs do not shine as mine does. They are
forced to have after school band practice with no late buses and no penalty for missing
rehearsals. They are not given a suitable classroom or supplies. Therefore, merit pay
would be great for me, but unfair as far as a lot of other teachers who have the misfortune
of having bad administrators.
Participant 97: How does one create a fair rubric for success in a performance without
having an understanding of the make-up of the group, the experience of the musicians, or
how far the students have come since rehearsals began? This is unfair and a disservice to
the teacher and students.
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Many elementary music educators expressed concern about the limited amount of instructional
time compared to their non-music teacher counterparts and indicated they only met with their
students once a week for 30-40 minutes. Participant 8 perceived such time constraints as
limitations for “students to learn the fundamentals of music unless they are gifted and/or taking
private lessons on their own.” Other elementary music teachers speculated about the
misappropriation of funds specifically for performance-based programs at the upper level instead
of rewarding experiential learning opportunities in the elementary setting.
Some identified demographics related to socioeconomic status, location, and household
characteristics as student variables beyond the teacher’s control. Questions ranged from “How
can you award merit pay for student progress if there are major differences between populations
from town to town?” to “I work in a one square mile town that has a school with 386 students.
Will I be judged against schools with 2,500+ to see if I deserve merit pay?” Another respondent
further questioned the socioeconomic disparity between two districts and how the high visibility
and reputation of one district may undermine the accomplishments of another:
Participant 192: Who does the better job? The person in a high end district who has an
award winning music program or the person in a lower performing district who keeps
kids involved in a wonderful activity. Both are very valuable, but in some places the first
person would receive a bonus and the other not. That is the danger of merit pay.

Inner city music educators expressed additional concerns regarding the transient nature of their
student populations and the lack of consistency from one year to another:
Participant 244: In my urban school district there is too much inconsistency with
students. Each year it is almost a completely different set of students. Therefore it is hard
to assess real improvement. Even throughout the school year there is too much turnover
of students. The students and their families frequently move around the city or even to
other states and countries. Also, many students are just trying to make it through the day
due to violence, violent death in families, abuse, drug and substance abuse, etc. It is hard
for students to achieve when their basic needs are not being met. These are things outside
of the teacher’s control.
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Such factors may contribute to a challenging teaching environment and place urban music
teachers at an unfair disadvantage in receiving merit pay based upon student progress.
Discussion
Merit pay is a common form of compensation in a variety of professions and marketbased environments. The assumption is that more money will motivate and inspire workers to
grow and develop into more productive or effective employees. Several politicians, educators,
and business leaders continue to advocate for merit pay programs in education as an effort to
improve student achievement. Legislators in the State of Florida Senate and House recently
attempted to pass a bill to impose an increased property tax levy on school districts in violation
of the law for “failing to adopt a salary schedule that compensates classroom teachers or schoolbased administrators on the basis of student performance rather than years worked” (S.B. 6,
2010, p. 8). Despite these efforts, educational union and professional organization members
continue to oppose such programs and question their effectiveness (Martin, 2010). The findings
from this investigation, with a focus on music educators, substantiate previous research involving
the controversial aspects of merit pay for teachers including costs (Protsik, 1996), administrator
and teacher attitudes (Hartshorn, Prather, & Chance, 2001), teaching to the test (Kelley, 1998;
Noddings, 2007), and the demise of collegiality with increased competition (Chamberlin, Wragg,
Haynes, & Wragg, 2002).
While most music educators accepted stipends for extra time commitments, they rejected
merit pay based upon individual or group performance. Since a majority of respondents
(78.51%) received supplementary pay for extra duties, it is no surprise that receiving such an
incentive would predispose them to be in favor of the said benefit. Approximately one third
(35.54%) of survey respondents evidenced the strongest opposition to supplementary pay in the
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form of a sign on bonus during the initial year of employment. Such one time bonuses ranging
from $2,000.00 to $20,000.00 served as attempts to attract new recruits to the field of education
in the states of Massachusettes, Nevada, Tennessee, and Texas (Liu, Johnson, & Peske, 2004). It
is understandable that most early career music teachers (62%) would favor such pay incentives
while less than half of their middle (37%) and late (30%) career counterparts would support first
year sign on bonuses. This finding also seems to indicate the adoption of sign on bonuses may
lead to resentment among experienced teachers towards their early career colleagues.
Furthermore, Chapman and Hutcheson (1982) and Goodlad (1983) determined that although
beginning teachers may not expect high salaries upon employment, dissatisfied mid-career
teachers often leave the profession because of low remuneration.
Co-curricular activity sponsorship was the only pay incentive or supplement received by
a majority of the respondents (78.51%) while only three participants (.48%) reported earning
merit pay for teaching in a shortage field such as math or science. Merit pay for teaching specific
subjects or rewarding all faculty for student improvement in a target area such as math or writing
may result in a narrow curriculum or less instructional time in other areas such as music or
physical education (Chamberlin, et al., 2002). An interesting finding was that participants
indicated stronger opposition to additional pay in the form of a sign on bonus during the initial
year of employment than supplementary pay for teaching in a shortage field, given the survey
identified math and science, not music, as such fields. While these findings were not statistically
significant, future investigators may reveal why music teachers are more opposed to
location/recruitment incentives than monetary rewards for teaching in a shortage field.
The demographic data from this study related to public school music teachers within the
state of New Jersey. According to the United States Census Bureau (2010), New Jersey is second
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to Washington D.C. as the most densely populated state with 1,195.5 people per square mile,
hence the higher percentages of urban and suburban locations within this study. Although
teachers from all 21 counties within the state responded to the survey, a possible limitation of
this investigation may be an underrepresentation of rural music educators’ opinions of merit pay.
Public school districts within the state of New Jersey are also highly unionized. Despite the most
recent implementation of a merit pay plan in Newark, the state’s largest city, and the current
governor’s staunch support of monetary incentives for New Jersey’s best teachers, members of
the state’s largest teacher’s union are strongly opposed to performance pay for educators (New
Jersey Education Association, 2011; Giroux, 2012). Future researchers might consider teacher
perceptions of merit pay in states with less union presence and collective bargaining power as
previous researchers found “a strong, inverse relationship between the use of merit pay and the
degree of union influence” (Ballou, 2001, p. 59). A final limitation of the current study was that I
excluded private school music teachers. Given the acceptance and prevalence of merit pay
programs in non-religious private and charter schools (Ballou & Podgursky, 1993; Shuls &
Muranto, 2014), further investigators might compare public music teacher attitudes and opinions
of merit pay to those of private and non-traditional public schools.
In summary, this study supported several generalizations for music educators within the
state of New Jersey based upon the data received: (a) Most districts compensate music teachers
for fulfilling for additional responsibilities outside of the standard teaching contractual
agreement, (b) There is widespread skeptisism of the fairness and appropriate implementation of
a performance-based pay system for music educators, and (c) The demographic charcteristics of
location and grade level among music teachers do not account for any significant differences of
opinion regarding various forms of merit pay. Future researchers might wish to investigate other
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states than the one used in this study to contribute to the literature. There is also a lack of studies
regarding the need to develop effective means of identifying merit among music teachers in
districts and states that mandate performance-based programs. Additionally, qualitative case
study investigations of administrator and music teacher concerns regarding merit pay programs
may provide more empirical data regarding the acceptance, effectiveness, and validity of such
controversial policies.
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Appendix
Merit Pay Study Questionnaire
Demographics
1. Please indicate primary area of employment:
_____ Elementary (K-5)
_____ Middle (6-8)

_____ Secondary (9-12)

2. Please indicate the total number of years you have been teaching: _______
Incentives and Compensation
For the following pay incentives, please indicate whether you favor or oppose each incentive
and whether you now receive the incentive by marking X in each box.
Additional pay for assuming
additional responsibilities as
master or mentor teacher (e.g.
supervising new teachers)

_______ Strongly favor
_______ Mildly favor
_______ Mildly oppose
_______ Strongly oppose

_____ I receive this incentive.
_____ I do not receive this incentive

Additional pay for teaching in a
shortage field (e.g. math, science)

_______ Strongly favor
_______ Mildly favor
_______ Mildly oppose
_______ Strongly oppose

_____ I receive this incentive.
_____ I do not receive this incentive

Additional pay for teaching in a
high priority location (e.g. inner
city school)

_______ Strongly favor
_______ Mildly favor
_______ Mildly oppose
_______ Strongly oppose

_____ I receive this incentive.
_____ I do not receive this incentive

Additional pay for sponsoring cocurricular activities (e.g.
marching band, musicals, clubs)
and/or coaching sports

_______ Strongly favor
_______ Mildly favor
_______ Mildly oppose
_______ Strongly oppose

_____ I receive this incentive.
_____ I do not receive this incentive

Salary increases as a part of a
career ladder in which teachers
progress through several
promotional levels based on their
performance
An individualized merit pay
bonus for exceptional
performance within a given year

_______ Strongly favor
_______ Mildly favor
_______ Mildly oppose
_______ Strongly oppose
_______ Strongly favor
_______ Mildly favor
_______ Mildly oppose
_______ Strongly oppose

_____ I receive this incentive.
_____ I do not receive this incentive

A school wide bonus for all
teachers in a school that shows
exceptional performance or
improvement within a given year

_______ Strongly favor
_______ Mildly favor
_______ Mildly oppose
_______ Strongly oppose

_____ I receive this incentive.
_____ I do not receive this incentive

_____ I receive this incentive.
_____ I do not receive this incentive

Additional Comments: ___________________________________________________________
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